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Meiji Japanese leaders consisted of an oligarchy that strived to overcome 
Western imperialist pressures in Asia. They did so by overturning some deeply rooted 
Tokugawa-Era traditions in Japanese society and replaced them with Western ones. They 
understood that Western norms dictated world affairs, so they sought to make Japan 
strong along Western norms. Modeling the West provided enough traction for Japan to 
meet Western threats and maintain its sovereignty. Meiji leaders reshaped Japan’s 
foreign policies by emphasizing foreign affairs, emulating Western boundary-making, 
revising the unequal trade treaties, and asserting themselves regionally with Korea. 
They simultaneously created a centralized military to support new foreign policies 
by conscripting soldiers from across the country; equipping, training, organizing 
them in a Western fashion; instilling self-discipline; and creating a symbiotic 
relationship between domestic industries and the military. Meiji Japan’s foreign 
policy evolution and military reforms enabled Japan to not only maintain its 
sovereignty, but also challenge the regional hierarchy. This paper thus focuses on 
Meiji Japan’s foreign policy and military. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The rise of Meiji Japan occurred over a period of several decades. It began as a 
reaction to Western military threats, yet Japan transformed into a great power in a 
relatively short period of time. European and American countries took centuries to 
consolidate domestic power before having significant international influence. Japan 
turned into a great power and overturned Western unequal treaties that had been imposed 
less than half a century before.  
The Meiji leadership found ways to quickly develop state power. 1  On the 
domestic front, they sought to centralize power, refocus the economy toward industry, 
reform the social structure to feed industrial output, reshape society to strengthen the 
nation against external threats, and boost military power. Their unique methods in 
achieving these ends rapidly built a stronger state. In doing so, the new leadership also 
strengthened Japan’s international position. Despite the Meiji leadership’s initial lack of 
an overarching plan, they found ways to carry out a top-down revolution that transformed 
Japan into a competitive world power. This raises the question of how the Meiji regime’s 
top down revolution enabled Japan to turn into a great power in such a short period 
of time. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Japan’s approach to change during the Meiji Era was key to major changes in 
Asia for more than a century. The rise of Meiji Japan affected East Asia by bringing 
Japan from isolation into regional relations as one of the only two Asian countries that 
retained sovereignty.2 Japanese leadership’s determination to become a strong country 
brought increased colonization to East Asia that intensified during WWII and eventually 
                                                 
1 Thomas C. Smith, “Japan’s Aristocratic Revolution,” The Yale Review (1960–1961): 371. 
2 The other country is Thailand. 
2
led to European countries losing colonies in the region. These events shaped nationalism 
throughout East Asia, and China and Korean nationalism still have a significant dose of 
anti-Japanese sentiment to this day. Meiji Japan also supplied a template for East Asian 
governments to develop their economies in a top-down fashion during the Cold War. 
Understanding how Meiji leadership enabled Japan to become a great power also 
provides insights into how Japan became what it is today—an economically strong but 
militarily weak country. 
The Meiji Restoration began as an effort to better handle foreign interactions such 
as trade and military threats. However, there was no coherent plan for defining success or 
how to achieve it. Through trial and error, the Meiji leadership changed Japan’s internal 
workings to create a new national system and more robust state that gave Japan more 
weight in international affairs. On the other hand, opening to the West created some 
chaos within the country. The manner in which Meiji leadership responded to this 
domestic chaos—and in some ways created more—defined and brought success. The top-
down nature of the Japanese revolution allowed for effective decision-making 
that centralized domestic politics and boosted economic developments. 
Studying the Japanese case provides insight into effective state building methods. 
Meiji Japanese leadership achieved similar strength to Western powers by copying some 
Western features and remaking them to fit Japanese conditions. The Meiji state drove 
industrial development instead of waiting for private entrepreneurs to become interested, 
and the Meiji leadership introduced a representative political entity without authority to 
sway state politics. In doing so, the Meiji state bypassed some turmoil through which 
Western features developed. For example, Meiji Japan acquiesced to a representative 
government body without enduring an equivalent to England’s Oliver Cromwell. Japan’s 
experience provides an example for how to control a dissenting population while melding 
foreign achievements with one’s own country.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Scholars approach the rise of Meiji Japan from a number of different perspectives. 
There are four main approaches. Some literature analyzes the era’s changes with respect 
 3
to the West, partly because Meiji leaders attempted to reform Japan’s institutions so that 
the state could compete with Western imperial powers. These Western-centric 
frameworks tend to find Meiji changes in these areas lagging behind Western 
counterparts. Another analytic approach takes a Japanese-centric stance in an effort to see 
beyond Western influences and look at how Japan’s modern history grew out of Japanese 
values and institutions that existed prior to the arrival of the West. A third approach 
centers on how Japanese elites sought to develop national strength because of the 
international environment’s competitive nature. A fourth approach centers on a 
disgruntled upper class who initiated top-down reforms that resulted in quick changes to 
social structure, the political process, and the economy. The following sections 
summarize these four approaches 
1. Western-Centered History 
The main purpose of the Meiji Restoration was to make Japan strong and modern, 
which most historians interpret by analyzing Japan against Western standards. There is 
typically an assumption that “modernization” equates to and can only be achieved by 
“Westernization.” This was the main approach of historians up through 1960. Both 
Western and Japanese analysts compared Japan with Western Europe and America, 
because they tended to think that the “major elements of modernization were first 
introduced from the outside,” namely the West.3 This type of analysis tends to point out 
Meiji success or shortcomings in achieving Western changes. Authors in this school of 
thought therefore highlight how Meiji Japan was extraordinary in its fulfillment of 
Western ideals or stress how Meiji Japan fell short of realizing Western goals.  
Academic comparisons with the West tend to follow two roads. One road focuses 
on changes to social structure and government institutions.4 Since some of the resultant 
policies were adopted from Western institutions and some Meiji leaders wanted to 
                                                 
3 John Whitney Hall, “Changing Conceptions of the Modernization of Japan” in Changing Japanese 
Attitudes Toward Modernization, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 
11, 45. 
4 Andrew Gordon, A History of Modern Japan from Tokugawa Times to the Present (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 78–90. 
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implement more intensively Western institutions and values, it made sense to many 
scholars to compare Meiji government experiments with Western counterparts. The other 
road focuses on changes made to compete with the West in the economic and military 
realm. Since Meiji Japan began in reaction to hostile Western threats, the Meiji 
leadership set goals to meet these challenges. This sort of analysis also seemed 
appropriate to scholars, because different Meiji leaders compared their own country to 
the West.  
Many authors in the Western-centric school “explain modern Japanese history in 
terms of the conceptions of distortion and lag.”5 For instance, historians before the 1960s 
tended to villainize the “samurai, the zaibatsu, the Meiji constitution, [and] 
Confucianism.”6 These critiques often argued that the Meiji elite failed to implement 
Western-enough changes to achieve more Western-like success, because they adhered too 
closely to old Japanese values and institutions. By the 1960s, historians began to instead 
villainize the “lower class samurai, the parasitic landlord, [and] the warmongering 
general.”7 These critiques took aim at different issues, but they also highlighted how 
some Meiji personnel battled to preserve the Tokugawa way of life and thus hampered 
potential Meiji success in comparison to the West.  
Japanese Marxists also take the Western path of historical development as a 
standard by which to judge Japanese development. Marxism predicts that capitalism will 
lead to a working class revolution. Japanese Marxists argue that the Meiji elite avoided 
this by implementing partial reforms to steer society away from industrial failure. In 
effect, they hampered Japan from achieving its Marxist destiny.  
American Marxist E. H. Norman also tracked how the Meiji government led 
Japan down a path that differed from what Marxism predicted. Specifically, he focused 
on how the Liberal Party evolved from political societies and parties, and how the 
government responded to these organizations. He shows that the government responded 
                                                 
5 Hall, “Modernization of Japan,” 37. 
6 Ibid., 40. 
7 Ibid.. 
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by acquiescing to some political participation while stifling the development of more 
representative government institutions.8 This effectively kept the Liberal Party divorced 
form the working class and hampered working class motives from becoming part of the 
Liberal Party’s platform.  
Another analytic approach focuses on the spread of Western ideas and institutions 
to Meiji Japan. Scholars of this ilk track how Japanese who traveled to Europe and 
America were exposed to Western concepts of government and society.9 These concepts 
spread in Japan and eventually Japan established a representative government body that 
resembled Western ones.10 However, Japan’s government differed from constitutional 
monarchies of the time period, such as Great Britain. Some authors find this important 
because while the government was introducing measures to expose Japan to Western 
ideas for militarism and wealth, Western ideas such as a parliament and liberal rights also 
came in and became distorted.11  
For instance, it took the government and populace time to develop relatively 
stable ideas of individual rights and government responsibilities toward citizens. For 
example, Norman explores how the agrarian sector sought to embody the Western ideals 
of individual liberties and government responsibilities to citizens. He explains how at 
first, “discontented samurai”12 led agrarian revolts, and at times, these revolts “expressed 
a vague aspiration toward a fuller democracy.”13 After the Meiji government crushed the 
samurai component, the movement split. One splinter was “the movement of landowners 
… against the government policy of favoring the great mercantile and financial houses at 
the expense of the rural community.”14 Norman holds that this helped spur the People’s 
                                                 
8 E. Herbert Norman, Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State (New York: International Secretariat 
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), 167–177. 
9 Walter LaFeber, The Clash: A History of U.S.——Japan Relations (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, Inc., 1997), 36–38. 
10 Gordon, History of Modern Japan, 64.  
11 Ibid., 78. 
12 Norman, Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State, 168. 
13 Ibid., 168. 
14 Ibid., 168. 
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Rights movement,15 which led the push for constitutional government and “formed the 
background of the Liberal Party Jiyuto.”16  Their calls for a representative assembly 
capitalized on tax complaints.17  Another way that proponents of the Popular Rights 
Movement framed their new predicament was that “national wealth and military power 
might be incongruous.”18 More liberal Japanese—including the liberal press—supported 
this idea.19 They believed that the end goal was civilizational parity with the West. To an 
extent, the government believed that Japanese civilization lagged behind; it sent Jiyuto 
leaders abroad to learn about Western “political institutions.”20 However, the government 
also used repressive measures to maintain centralized power.21 Scholars thus concluded 
from the government’s action that it did not place as much emphasis on individual rights 
as Western powers, and that the government was not liberal enough to be modern.  
Japanese liberals also took the West as a model to judge Japanese development. 
Fukuzawa Yukichi’s work was a prime example. He “argued that… Wisdom…could be 
learned from abroad but was best nurtured at home.”22 Fukuzawa and his contemporaries 
saw Japan in need of catching up to the West. With a backdrop of opulent Western-style 
parties and calls to revise the Japanese spoken and written language to be more like 
European languages, defining “Japaneseness” and promoting it became a concern.23 
Fukuzawa supported liberal values, yet placed the state’s rights above individual rights, 
and he “taught the dignity of the individual”24 within the context of strengthening the 
                                                 
15 Norman, Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State, 169. 
16 Ibid., 169. 
17 Ibid., 171. 
18 Richard J. Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army” National Security and the Technological 
Transformation of Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 36. 
19 Ibid., 33. 
20 Norman, Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State, 179. 
21 Ibid., 180. 
22 Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army,” 43. 
23 Donald H. Shively, “The Japanization of the Middle Meiji,” in Tradition and Modernization in 
Japanese Culture, ed. Donald H. Shively (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), 93–97. 
24 David J. Lu, Japan: A Documentary History (Armonk, NY: An East Gate Book, 1997), 346–350.  
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nation. This differed from Western liberal thinkers and movements that expressed 
individual rights as higher priorities than increasing state power. 
2. Japan-Centered History 
Another group of historians analyze the Meiji Era with respect to its Japanese past 
instead of its Western contemporaries. This approach began in the 1970s, and Sheldon 
Garon calls it the “non-modernizationist” approach. Their framework rejects comparing 
Japanese and Western modernization because the hallmarks of Japanese modernization 
went beyond ideas for “greater democracy and social justice” and included other vital and 
unique aspects.25 John Whitney Hall has critiqued the Western-centric school for making 
no effective effort to expand the standard of modern beyond “Westernization, 
democratization, or industrialization.”26 Japan-centric advocates thus claim to understand 
the Meiji transformations more fully by analyzing Japan’s changes without comparing 
them to Western contemporaries, thus avoiding judgement that Japan lagged behind 
Western changes.27  In doing so, they are able to explore the Meiji Era’s top-down 
changes with respect to their origins in Japanese values and institutions.28  
A specific school within the non-modernizationist camp arose in the 1970s called 
“Minshushi.”29 These scholars approach Japanese history by focusing on “the relation 
between social structure and values,” “ideas,” and “attitudes.”30 They reject the non-
emotional Marxist approach, and are sometimes vulnerable to the critique that they 
romanticize Japanese culture as without fault and view it as timeless and unchanging. For 
example, some historians explain some Meiji political attitudes in terms of the “purity” of 
                                                 
25 Sheldon Garon “Rethinking Modernization and Modernity in Japanese History: A Focus on State-
Society Relations,” The Journal of Asian Studies 53, no.2 (May 1994), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2059838, 348. 
26 Hall, “Modernization of Japan,” 11. 
27 Ibid., 10. 
28 Garon, “Modernity in Japanese History,” 362. 
29 Carol Gluck, “The People in History: Recent Trends in Japanese Historiography,” The Journal of 
Asian Studies 38, no.1 (Nov 1978), https://www.jstor.org/stable/2054236, 38. 
30 Ibid., 38. 
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the “common man,” specifically focusing on village life.31 Yet, Japan-centered historians 
claim that by leaving Western ideologies aside and focusing on processes internal to 
Japan before and after the arrival of the West, they are better able to understand how the 
Meiji reforms emerged from Japanese values and institutions.32  
3. International Competition and National Self Strengthening 
Other historians focus on the Meiji leadership’s desperation to strengthen the 
state, its military, and “achieve economic autonomy in the face of hostile powers.”33 
Overturning the unequal trade treaties and developing a formidable military would signal 
Japan’s success in these matters. 34  To accomplish this, Japan had to make itself 
defensible by centralizing power, producing exports, and creating a strong military.35 To 
produce industrial output for the economy and military, Japan had to improve its 
technological capabilities.36 Japanese leadership accomplished these goals because they 
saw Japan in constant competition with Western powers and thus used lessons from 
Western countries to improve their competitive edge.37 
For instance, W. G. Beasley highlights how Meiji reforms were part of 
international competition between Japan and Western states.38 He explores how factors 
like land reform, aristocratic evolution, government institutional evolution, Western 
relations, and legal reform detracted from and improved Japan’s strength. Although he 
also examines how some Meiji leaders saw their role as making Japan modern in a social 
sense, Beasley concludes that their end goal was to make Japan defensible. Most of his 
explanatory factors focused on the ways that the Meiji regime created a stable, 
                                                 
31 Gluck, “Trends in Japanese Historiography,” 32–33. 
32 Ibid., 38, 47. 
33 Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army,” 37. 
34 Ibid., 3. 
35 Ibid., 44. 
36 Ibid., 45, 83. 
37 LaFeber, The Clash: A History of U.S.——Japan Relations, 13–64. 
38 W. G. Beasley, “Meiji Political Institutions,” in vol. 5 of The Cambridge History of Japan, ed. 
Marius B. Jansen (Cambridge, NJ: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 646. 
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centralized power, which could militarily project in order to best defend itself through 
offensive deterrence.39  
Other scholars, most notably Richard Samuels, apply the idea of 
“technonationalism” to the Meiji era.40 Samuels argues that technonationalism resulted 
from the Meiji drive to improve Japan’s technological competitiveness. This focus on the 
military aspect of fitting into the “modern world” indirectly but drastically affected the 
civilian sector of Japan.41 The driving force of change in Japanese society was therefore 
largely centered on achieving military advancement with respect to the West. According 
to Samuels, “Japan’s national technology policy comprised three elements: (1) import-
substituting indigenization… to stimulate local development; (2) … the distribution of 
this know-how throughout the economy; and (3) the nurturance of a capacity to innovate 
and manufacture.” 42  He then shows that “Technology … was a matter of national 
security, and the bundle of beliefs and practices that constitute this view can be called 
“technonationalism.’”43  
Another approach, advocated by Walter Lafeber, emphasizes how the clash 
between the U.S. and Japan fueled the development of a strong economy and military in 
Meiji Japan. The U.S. “opened” Japan, initiating a chain reaction in which the Japanese 
elite sought to mimic the US’s economic and military power. Lafeber frames his analysis 
between Perry’s arrival and imperial competition of the 1900s in this light.44 In doing so, 
he highlights how the fertile environment for clashes developed alongside fear in each 
country’s leadership. He emphasizes the role that Western ambassadors played and the 
reaction they created in Japan.45 He also explains how trips abroad affected different 
influential Meiji leaders. They returned with a broad range of Western ideas to make 
                                                 
39 Beasley, “Meiji Political Institutions,” 672–673. 
40 Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army,” 33. 
41 Ibid., 33. 
42 Ibid., 33. 
43 Ibid., 33. 
44 LaFeber, The Clash: A History of U.S——Japan Relations, 13–64. 
45 Ibid., 16–22, 25. 
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Japan more competitive and “modern.” These missions had three purposes: learn Western 
ideas, improve relations with the West, and negotiate better trade treaties. Japan’s 
leadership wanted to use knowledge from these missions to achieve “economic and 
military security”46 with respect to the West.47 
4. Meiji Japan as a Restoration or Revolution 
There is some debate about whether the Meiji Restoration should be called a 
revolution or a restoration. Characterizing Meiji Japan as a result of a restoration implies 
that an older institution or system was strengthened. Since Meiji Japan succeeded the 
Tokugawa Era, a restoration would have to draw from an institution or system that 
preceded the Tokugawa Shogunate. On the other hand, characterizing the Meiji Era as a 
revolution implies that it shattered the previous system and implemented something 
entirely new.  
The Meiji leadership claimed that the term “restoration” was most appropriate 
because they strengthened the existing imperial institution and adapted it to modern 
demands. It can be said that the Meiji leaders did in fact do this, as they placed the Meiji 
Emperor back at the pinnacle of Japanese political power, and they were thus not 
revolutionary, because they did not overthrow Japanese institutions and values to the 
same extent as the French or Russian Revolutions. They restored a former system. Meiji 
changes retained an ancient institution and strengthened it by redefining how it served 
Japan’s new needs.48  
Thomas C. Smith, on the other hand, argues that the Meiji Restoration was not a 
restoration that revived old values and institutions, but rather a top-down revolution. 
Members of the upper class revolutionized life for both upper and lower classes of 
society. They used the Meiji Emperor’s restoration as a spark to ignite radical changes in 
society, politics, and the economy throughout the country. 
                                                 
46 Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army,” 33. 
47 LaFeber, The Clash: A History of U.S——Japan Relations, 37–39. 
48 Gordon, History of Modern Japan, 61–21. 
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Thomas C. Smith argued that the Japanese aristocracy differed from Western 
aristocracies enough to instigate the Meiji Restoration. Unlike Western ruling classes, 
Japanese elites had more to gain from changing the domestic order than fighting to retain 
it.49 The changing international circumstances that led to Perry’s ultimatum provided an 
opportunity for the Japanese aristocracy to gain prestige and influence. Thus, some 
members of this class centralized power, transformed the social structure and opened up 
new social opportunities.50 This leads to the conclusion that Meiji Japan’s prosperity was 
unique because of Japan’s unique top-down revolution. If the upper class had not been 
disgruntled at the same time as an opportunity for change appeared, they would not have 
risked a drastic revolution.51 Their support was vital to the success of Meiji reform, as 
their position in the upper class meant that they both saw the outside threat more clearly 
and had a better position from which to bring about change. A lower class revolution 
would likely not have achieved similar results.  
In a similar vein, historians such as John Whitney Hall, Richard Samuels, and 
Walter LaFeber, argue that the Meiji Era did not constitute “a bourgeois revolution,” but 
rather an oligarchy that “imposed… absolutism.”52 This oligarchy gravitated toward two 
ideas: fukoku kyohei and shokusan kogyo. Fukoku kyohei marries the ideas of national 
wealth and strength.53 Sokusan kogyo is translatable as “the nurturance and protection of 
domestic industry”54 Meiji leaders tried to realize these ideas.55 Examples include how 
Okubo Toshimichi “established the Ministry of Home Affairs” after he witnessed 
similarly important institutions in Europe.56 Okuma Shigenobu also founded the Ministry 
of Engineering and “stipulated that the purpose of the new ministry was to achieve 
                                                 
49 Smith, “Japan’s Aristocratic Revolution,” 370, 373–377. 
50 Ibid., 377–379. 
51 Ibid., 370–371. 
52 Hall, “Modernization of Japan,” 13. 
53 Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army,” 36. 
54 Ibid., 37. 
55 Ibid., 40. 
56 Ibid., 38. 
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…richness of the country…and the need for military buildup.”57 Likewise, Yamagato 
Aritomo focused on making Japan strong through military expansion.58  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Historians typically address the Meiji Restoration through major factors that 
changed in Japan. These factors included Western influence, political power, economic 
development, and social changes. These provide the main explanations for how an 
oligarchy morphed Japan into an international success. Japan began interacting with the 
West in a similar fashion to other East and Southeast Asian countries: a superior military 
forced it into unequal treaties. Yet Japan was able to change course once interaction 
began. The top-down restoration facilitated this swift change of course. Competent Meiji 
leadership from the upper classes saw a necessity to change and opportunities to change 
for the better. They incrementally changed interactions with the West, centralized power, 
revamped the social structure, and built a competitive economy.  
1. Western Influences Facilitated a Top-Down Restoration 
The Meiji leadership implemented Western ideas to overcome Western 
dominance. Most authors open their discussion of the Meiji Restoration with the catalyst: 
Commodore Matthew Perry’s arrival to “open” Japan in 1853.59 The Japanese leadership 
was aware of the Western powers’ activities in Qing China, and thus knew that resistance 
was futile.60 In an attempt to realize a destiny different from a Japanese version of the 
Opium Wars, the Tokugawa leadership agreed to unequal trade treaties. This created a 
fissure within elite society that brought the Tokugawa’s downfall and a new oligarchy’s 
rise behind the Emperor. The new oligarchy devoted much of their activities to neutralize 
these unequal trade treaties.61 They explored and often transplanted a large spectrum of 
                                                 
57 Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army,” 37. 
58 LaFeber, The Clash: A History of U.S——Japan Relations, 47–48. 
59 Gordon, History of Modern Japan, 49. 
60 Ibid., 48. 
61 Ibid., 62, 73–86. 
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Western ideas into Japan to achieve this end.62 Part of their means and their overarching 
end goal meant a closer and often friendlier relationship with Western powers. 
2. Centralizing Power Was Key to the Meiji Regime’s Top-Down 
Revolution 
Meiji leadership overcame domestic obstacles in a timely manner. The new 
oligarchy did so by centralizing power. This contributed to the Meiji regime’s top-down 
revolution because it allowed the newly-powerful central government to mobilize the 
populace in ways that benefited the state. This meant disintegrating the feudal power 
structure that had stabilized Japan for over two centuries during the Tokugawa period. 
The Tokugawa Shogun leaned on the feudal entities that naturally developed as a 
bulwark against internal chaos, since they were strong entities. The Shogun used their 
strength to his benefit by allowing feudal lords to retain their hard-won regional power in 
exchange for submission. This power structure permeated economic, social, and 
government aspects of Japan at every level.63  
The new oligarchs took a trial-and-error approach to reforming the feudal 
structures of Tokugawa Japan that required time and caused friction.64 If they had moved 
more quickly and drastically, they would have likely faced overwhelming friction and 
failed. If they had moved more gradually and less thoroughly, they would have likely 
faced the same unending-obstacles of Qing China’s failed self-strengthening 
movements.65 Before the Meiji Restoration, the government consisted of feudal entities 
loyal to the Shogunate in an internationally isolated Japan.66 This was congruent with 
neither Japan’s new need to interact with the West, nor with the new oligarchy’s goal to 
do so on an equal level. Tactfully, centralizing power away from regional interests 
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eventually allowed the government to build up the country’s industrial capacity. The 
oligarchy also changed the institutional bodies that made up the government in order to 
meet new external responsibilities. These bodies morphed over time to meet new issues 
that arose as Japan’s society responded to the new government requirements.67  
These changes would not have occurred without a willing oligarchy. Neither the 
Emperor nor the poorest in society instigated the Meiji Restoration. As Thomas C. Smith 
points out, the aristocracy instigated and successfully led “sweeping” change in Japan.68 
The samurai class took control of the country’s two leading individuals, and cities then 
formed a ring of support under one of them. A few members of the former aristocracy 
formed this ultimately stable support ring. Some pulled the country toward militarism 
while others focused energy on domestic matters. 69  The oligarchy navigated this 
minefield of malcontent and differences and steered Japan away from the fate of nearly 
every other Asian country while laying groundwork for Japan’s imperialist rise and fall.  
3. The Meiji Oligarchy Reshaped Japan’s Economy to Make Japan 
Stronger 
The oligarchy that emerged during the Meiji Restoration changed the social fabric 
of Japan at all levels in response to the new international situation. The ruling oligarchy 
brought in new Western influences and new economic and military requirements. The 
ruling oligarchy also tried to make the Japanese economy strong. They wanted to make 
Japan a great power to avoid becoming a victim of great powers.70 Their efforts included 
dissolving feudal lords’ tax bases, improving farming methods, supporting textile and 
mining industries to boost military development, and integrating women into the 
workforce. These changes increased central government revenue, industrial output, and 
agricultural yield. 71  By carrying out these reforms, Japan eventually was able to 
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overcome the unequal treaties that began with Perry’s arrival and become a great 
power.72 
4. Japanese Society’s Reactions to Meiji Reforms Shaped Japan’s Rise 
The Meiji reforms required much more public involvement in government affairs 
than in the preceding centuries. They provided platforms for people to voice different 
ideas about how best to run the country.73 This caused a wave of rebellion and ongoing 
changes. 74  Popular responses to toward government activities were important. They 
shaped the effectiveness of the state’s push for heavy industry, increased military 
participation and dissolution of the elite.75 In the end, Japan’s new oligarchy successfully 
spurred a new social structure that melded East and West without following a model. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study argues that the Meiji Restoration was a top-down revolution led by an 
oligarchic leadership, whose end goal was to maintain sovereignty for Japan with as 
much dignity as possible. Their goal intrinsically focused on how external entities saw 
Japan because that determined how they interacted with Japan. Therefore, Japan’s 
changed approach to foreign affairs was arguably the most successful aspect of the Meiji 
Era. The leaders deftly wove military strengthening into its foreign policy evolution. 
They understood that Western countries were the most powerful in the world as such 
their ideas about how countries interacted constituted the “rulebook” for international 
relations. Since the West valued intricate diplomacy and trade along with a centralized 
military capable of supporting assertive foreign policies, Meiji leaders pursued these ends. 
They molded domestic governance and society to help meet these ends, but ultimately 
reshaping and controlling internal issues supported the more important external goal. 
Thus, this thesis aims to understand Meiji Japan’s path toward meeting this external goal 
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through diplomatic and military changes. This thesis further narrows the window of 
analysis to early and middle Meiji Japan because they were the most critical periods. 
Meiji leaders faced a race against time to prove their respectability to the Western powers 
that had just defeated the regional hegemon. Meiji leaders demonstrated remarkable 
ability to jumpstart changes in Japan so quickly after the Restoration that they set the 
country on track to continuous growth and stability.  
This study is not a political science analysis; it will not confirm or refute existing 
theories. Instead, this study will provide a narrative history of how the Meiji oligarchy 
strengthened Japan in terms of Western interactions and military reforms. To accomplish 
this, it will address Western treaties and visits, increasingly assertive foreign policies, 
creation of a military, industrial growth, and popular reactions to new government 
decisions. 
Sources include chronological histories and political analysis from different time 
periods because they present Meiji leadership’s goals and methods in different lights. 
Vital scholars for analytic material include Akira Irye, Ian Nish, Meirion and Susie 
Harries, Marius B. Jansen, and Richard Samuels. Irye explores how Meiji leadership 
altered Japan’s foreign policy to align with contemporary Western standards.76 Nish 
chronically examines how foreign ministers gradually reshaped Japan’s approach to 
foreign affairs, particularly regarding the unequal treaties.77 Harries and Harries analyze 
how state-level military reforms developed throughout the Meiji period and created a 
strong, loyal, and centralized army. 78  Jansen provides insight into the single most 
important individual driving military reform: Yamagata Aritomo.79  Richard Samuels 
examines how the Japanese military developed from a small relatively weak entity to a 
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large powerful force in concert with economic growth.80 Taken together, these and other 
historians of Japan greatly assist in understanding how the Meiji oligarchy successfully 
launched a top-down revolution that remade Japan’s foreign policy, economic, and 
military structures to transformed Japan into a great power.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis is organized in three more chapters. The second chapter focuses on 
how the government improved foreign relations. Specifically, it analyzes how it built a 
new ministry, learned about the West, clarified its borders, successfully brought to an end 
the unequal treaties that foreign powers imposed on Japan, and developed assertive 
foreign policies.  
The third chapter explores how the oligarchy developed a strong economy and 
military. In building a centralized conscript army, the Meiji leadership defied Japanese 
tradition and bound even low-ranking soldiers to directly serve the state. In investing in 
industries that support military needs, they created a symbiotic cycle of profitable 
businesses that could domestically provide valuable military resources.81 
The fourth chapter is the conclusion and summarizes this study’s findings on the 
Meiji oligarchy’s top-down revolution. It highlights what has been learned about the 
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II. MEIJI JAPAN’S FOREIGN POLICY EXPANSION 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Despite Japan’s weak position when America’s Commodore Perry arrived in 
1853, the incident spurred Japan to alter its approach to foreign affairs.82 Meiji Japan 
began to sanction foreign interactions and crafted a foreign policy that resembled 
Western ones. This put Japan in a drastically different situation than it found itself in 
1853, eventually rising as one of the world’s powers. Meiji oligarchs working in the 
Emperor’s name sought and developed new relationships between Japan and other 
countries in a changed world.  
This chapter argues that the West’s movement into East Asia pressured Meiji 
leaders to evolve Japan’s foreign policies. Their principal changes included placing a new 
emphasis on learning about and replicating Western-style foreign affairs. They shaped 
foreign policy to align with Western norms by aggressively claiming and clearly defining 
boundaries while undoing the unequal trade treaties that had caused Japan’s initial 
predicament. These foreign policy reforms encountered both domestic and international 
problems. As Western ideas about engaging the populace in politics swept into the 
country, nationalism encouraged people to support aggressive policies. Competing 
factions among Western powers also became a roadblock to Japan’s ability to assert itself 
among its neighbors. However, the Meiji oligarchs’ earnest efforts to behave like the 
most powerful countries of their era succeeded in earning respect for Japan.  
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B. CONTEXT  
1. Tokugawa Foreign Policy  
The Tokugawa dynasty had mostly “insulated” the country from “the dangers of 
European connection” for over 200 years before the undercurrents of the Meiji 
Restoration began.83 Christianity posed potential problems for the early Shoguns and 
their immediate predecessor Toyotomi Hideyoshi in maintaining control of a unified 
Japan. Catholic European leaders in Japan exercised strong control over large groups of 
Japanese Christians, and in the port city of Nagasaki developed military capabilities and 
secular authority. Some Christian Japanese lords had forced their subordinates to convert, 
and had the potential to form a military “holy league” against the national seat of 
power.84 To protect against potential threats, national leaders created strict anti-Western 
policies. 
The main structures of Tokugawa foreign policy came to prohibit most 
engagements with the West. Japanese were not allowed to be Christian, Japanese who 
tried to venture abroad faced a death sentence, and Japanese who did venture abroad were 
forbidden from returning.85 It was also illegal to build “ships capable of sailing to foreign 
countries” or “expor[t] weapons.”86 Foreign interaction on Japanese soil was also limited. 
Dutch traders were the only Christians permitted into Japan because, as Protestants, they 
“were enemies”87 of the Catholic faith that had previously built a contagious power base 
loyal to a foreign pontiff. However, even the Dutch were restricted to one trading station  
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in the only port authorized to participate in Western trade: Deshima88 in Nagasaki.89 
Foreign traders from Northeast Asia—particularly the Chinese and Koreans- enjoyed 
more access to Japanese ports in other parts of the country.90 Interestingly, Tokugawa 
Shoguns required the Dutch to make tribute missions to the capital city that included 
reports about Western events. These trips provided the Dutch opportunities to interact 
with “representatives of each daimyo through whose land they moved” as well as court 
officials.91 While this exposed some of Japan’s ruling class to the West, the masses had 
little chance of similar exposure. The Shogunate allowed some Dutch books to circulate 
in educated circles, but heavily censored publications dealing with Western religious 
ideas.92 
The isolationist system changed slightly over the course of the Tokugawa 
dynasty, but mostly remained in place. As more sailors came to Japanese shores in the 
early 1800s, the Shogun’s cabinet enacted “measures to increase the study of European 
languages” but did not try to change the stigma that official anti-Western laws had 
created.93 Instead, the Shoguns gradually reduced the number of ships that the Dutch 
could bring until the limit was one per year.94 The frequency of Dutch trips to the capitol 
city also fell from one per year to one every four years.95 Throughout this period of 
isolation, the Tokugawa Shoguns made no definitive moves to solidify Japan’s grasp 
beyond the three main islands Kyushu, Shikoku, and Honshu. When one lord from 
northern Honshu asked to establish dominance over Hokkaido in an effort to counter 
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Russian expansion, the Shogun refused.96 Japan’s official lack of concern or urge to 
interact with the world around it did not cause problems for generations. While this 
system helped the Shogunate maintain order domestically, it eventually made Japan 
vulnerable to external developments two centuries later.  
2. Collapse of Tokugawa Foreign Policy under Foreign Pressures  
Fear of the Western powers that had displaced China as the Asian hegemon 
pressured Japan into changing. The Opium Wars demonstrated Western aggression and 
caused fear in Japan because it was clear that the West might seek to forcefully engage 
with Japan next. 97  Within less than a decade after Commodore Perry’s arrival, the 
Japanese leadership felt threatened enough by Western powers to sign unequal treaties 
with five countries it had shunned for centuries. Perry’s arrival in 1853 from the United 
States prompted an unequal treaty with America in 1858.98 The treaty to which the 
Tokugawa Shogun had agreed was modeled after one that China had recently signed with 
the British and French. It essentially made Japan “subordinate to foreign governments” 
both “politically and economically.”99 The treaty included aspects like forcing eight ports 
to engage in foreign trade, “surrender[ing] tariff autonomy, and legal jurisdiction over the 
treaty ports.”100 Foreign settlements within Japan were formally established, primarily in 
Yokohama, Kobe, and Osaka just before and during the Meiji leaders taking power.101 
During the first 25 years of the unequal treaties, foreigners enjoyed extraterritoriality with 
consular courts and export trade grew so steeply through the 1870s that Japan was 
essentially a “client state” of the West. Japan acquiesced to foreign demands and 
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essentially replicated this treaty with Britain, France, Holland, and Russia.102  These 
events enflamed an internal debate among the Japanese elite about how to interact with 
the world.103  
Domestic turmoil worsened as some felt that Japan should command respect by 
acting with strength, while others felt a sense of urgency to strictly conform to standards 
set by more powerful countries. The former held tightly to traditional ideas that Japan 
should shun outsiders. The latter knew that Western outsiders were now capable of 
conquering Japan and that aloof behavior would not induce the West to leave Japan 
alone. Together these factions overthrew the Tokugawa Shogun for their own reasons. 
The Shogunate was doomed because domestic critics condemned the Shogun for 
acquiescing to Western demands that Japan was too weak to refuse. 
The Tokugawa Era and its foreign policy crumbled at a time when modern states 
around the world were supposed to define and expand their boundaries and have a 
military prepared to defend people within. Each modern state’s military was therefore a 
direct threat to others yet no one necessarily wanted to engage them. This meant that 
countries could use any avenue of engagement on a continuum ranging from inaction to 
war in order to compete. These included political influence, economic influence, and 
general prestige. Japan had to emulate the behavior of Western powers if it was going to 
survive as a sovereign state, yet the Tokugawa dynasty lacked both the military strength 
and domestic support to implement any options on the Western foreign policy continuum. 
The faction within Tokugawa Japan who understood the threat of the West consolidated 
their power as the new Meiji oligarchy. They made the changes that the Tokugawa 
government could not. 
C. FINDING NEW MODELS OF FOREIGN POLICY FROM ABROAD  
Meiji leaders made two major shifts in Japanese foreign policy shortly after 
coming to power. First, they appointed people to learn about and engage with the West. 
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The new Meiji leaders established a Foreign Ministry with multiple locations and 
fostered its accruement of foreign knowledge. Second, the Meiji government sponsored 
overseas missions to gain an in-depth understanding of how to shape Japan’s foreign 
policies. The combination of these initial foreign policy shifts taught Meiji oligarchs 
precisely where Japan stood in the world’s power structure. They eventually recognized 
that what Japan experienced in the 1850s was part of a larger international relations 
“playbook” that Western powers had devised, and began to “play” by those rules. 
Because the Tokugawa Era did not bequeath a strong military to the Meiji Era, Meiji 
leaders learned to avoid ambitious policies that Western powers would not tolerate until 
Japan had gained respect and credible military strength.  
1. Establishing the Foreign Ministry 
By July 1869, the new Imperial government had established six initial ministries 
including the Foreign Ministry. Iwakura Tomomi directed this Foreign Ministry from 
1871 until he died in 1883.104 As a Prince and a member of the Imperial Council, “the 
fact that he was prepared to accept the office of foreign minister…suggests that it was the 
intention of the new leaders that the Foreign Ministry should be one of the key 
instruments of the new government.”105 It had offices in both Tokyo and Yokohama so 
that both the port, which handled the majority of foreign interactions, and the capitol 
could devote appropriate levels of attention to foreign interactions and do so in lock-
step. 106  Previously, the Japanese government had most of its dealings with foreign 
governments only in port cities.107 Japan also brought foreign advisors into the Foreign 
Ministry. They predominantly consisted of American citizens, though they also employed 
British, German, and French advisors.108  
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The Ministry soon created an entire department to function as a foreign language 
school. 109  By the end of the 1860s—within two years of the Restoration—multiple 
translations of studies on international law widely circulated in the country. These 
included “Elements of International Law” and “Commentaries on International Law.”110 
The Ministry also translated “Britain’s most recent treaties in order to achieve some 
standard of comparison for those” recently imposed on Japan. 111  This shows how 
commonplace it had become to learn about Western concepts of foreign affairs in less 
than two decades after Commodore Perry shattered Japan’s isolation. 
2. Overseas Trips 
Meiji Japan initially learned about the Western criteria for “modern states”by 
officially sponsoring trips abroad. These trips helped them to do so and included the 
high-profile Iwakura Embassy from 1871–1873 but mostly comprised of students, 
bureaucrats, and some military commanders making smaller trips. Some of the most 
powerful men in the country participated in the Iwakura Embassy and essentially 
surveyed several European and American cities before returning.112 Some of the smaller 
missions included a former military commander “recruit[ing] foreign experts to assist in 
the development of Hokkaido,” and a bureaucrat who worked with the London postal 
service and eventually helped develop logistical aspects of running a capital city like 
Tokyo.113 
The government appointed Iwakura to lead several dozen senior statesmen 
overseas for a year and a half to learn about the West.114 This became known as the 
“Iwakura Embassy.”115 During this trip, Japan’s new key leaders learned how to affect 
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change in Japan’s international status. One of the first suggestions Iwakura made was to 
send imperial envoys to powerful Western countries. Another was to reshape Japan’s 
domestic institutions so that world powers would be more comfortable adjusting the 
judicial aspects of the unequal treaties.116 Evidence of this decision lies in how Iwakura 
rescinded the instruction to renegotiate the treaties and instead instructed those 
accompanying him to “seek knowledge from all over the world, restore Japan’s rights and 
reform faults in her institutions.”117 
The Embassy succeeded beyond bestowing knowledge on the Japanese. It also 
succeeded in “convey[ing] a spirit of interest in Westernization, of friendship and of 
earnestness.”118 The mission went through the United States, Britain, France, Germany, 
and Russia, changing the perception that Japan was thoroughly xenophobic.119 Japanese 
diplomats” style of dress also indicates an awareness of how to adapt in ways that 
induced Western countries’ approval. Unlike the Chinese, Japanese on government-
sponsored trips mostly dressed in Western styles while abroad.120 Behavior like this 
showed the West that the new Meiji Japan was committed to building good relationships 
instead of reviving isolationist policies.  
3. What Meiji Oligarchs Initially Learned  
Those who participated in the Iwakura Embassy were some of the highest-ranking 
men in the oligarchy. The most vital thing that they learned on the trip was the necessity 
to reform Japan and its foreign relations carefully so that Western powers would accept 
its presence as a responsible country. This meant behaving with caution until Japan had 
enough strength to behave like an imperialist power. The division in foreign policy views 
between those who remained in Japan and those who embarked on the trip underscored 
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the changes taking place. Meiji oligarchs had learned how much they needed to pull 
Japan away from its past foreign policies. 
The clearest example of this division of views on foreign affairs was when 
Iwakura and those who accompanied him to Western cities squashed plans to invade 
Korea with former Samurai.121 The plan was not without reason. After Japan unified 
under the Shogun hundreds of years previously, former Samurai who used to work for 
defeated lords became roving criminals and caused security problems for the pacified 
population.122 However, Iwakura and the other travelers learned that the power holders of 
the international community would see Japan as a land of barbarians if it attacked 
Korea.123 Iwakura even dismissed the man acting as Foreign Minister in his place for not 
grasping how fragile Japan’s reputation was.124 The decision to refrain from the Korean 
invasion meant that Japan could maintain amiable dealings with Western powers and 
China for the time being. Although Japan did impose the Kanghwa Treaty for free trade 
on Korea in 1876, Japan did not enforce it for nearly a decade in order to stave off 
international backlash.125 Meiji leaders’, quest to reform Japan’s foreign policy continued 
as they delicately tried to renegotiate the unequal trade treaties. - 
D. ALTERING JAPAN’S FOREIGN POLICIES 
Meiji oligarchs deliberately changed Japan’s foreign affairs in two fields to make 
Japan into a respectable and modern country. The first was renegotiating the unequal 
treaties that had begun Japan’s tumultuous entry into world events. Secondly—and 
simultaneously—they attempted to model Japan’s claiming and defending of its territory 
after that of Western empires. 
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1. Renegotiating Unequal Trade Treaties  
When Meiji Japan emerged, amending Japan’s humiliating unequal treaties was 
both a litmus test of strength and a goal in itself. It seems that Japan’s leaders first tried to 
rectify the situation by making a treaty with Korea in 1876. This Kanghwa treaty was an 
unequal treaty, but one in which Japan benefited. Japan used “threats and provocation” to 
pressure Korea into signing it. On its own, this treaty demonstrates Meiji leaders’ 
determination to be imperialistic instead of imperialized. Understanding China’s role in 
the situation underscores this determination. The Chinese Emperor had traditional 
sovereignty over the Korean Kingdom.126 Even though Korea was autonomous within 
that suzerainty, the Kangwha treaty contradicted the relationship between Korea and 
China. In doing so, the treaty challenged Japan’s relative position to China and 
foreshadowed the Sino-Japanese War to come. Despite Japan’s decision not to enforce 
this treaty for nearly a decade to avoid tension with the Russian Empire,127 the Kangwha 
treaty began Japan’s journey to commanding respect in treaty negotiations.  
Japan’s next steps in treaty revision consisted of failed negotiations with great 
powers from which the Foreign Ministry learned a great deal. Throughout 1886, Minister 
Inoue Kaoru “made considerable progress” at 36 meetings with foreign diplomats.128 
Renegotiating the treaties had a negative domestic impact, too. Though the process did 
not initiate a coup like the Meiji Restoration, it did dredge up old debates about the 
specifics of how Japan should interact with the rest of the world. The public and several 
ministers became outraged when they learned that his negotiations included plans to 
“allow Western judges to try cases involving foreigners,” continue setting import tariffs 
by treaty, and open “the whole of Japan…for foreign travel.”129 The Imperial government 
dissolved the Diet twice because there was so much public turmoil. In some cases, the 
emperor directed the Foreign Minister to conduct negotiations in secret, from both the 
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public and other ministers. However, some ministers resigned, including the Minister of 
Agriculture, Inoue resigned as well. Despite this, Inoue’s basic ideas for treaty revision 
did not die. They centered on making Japan seem more amenable toward the West.130 
Inoue had engaged the Ministry’s foreign advisors to make Japan’s law codes more 
similar to Western ones “in respect of laws, prisons, and punishments.” 131  Japan’s 
Western-style constitution also seems to have been important in maneuvering Japan into 
a better bargaining position. 
Mutsu Munemitsu was the next Foreign Minister with great impact. 132  He 
oversaw Japan’s first successful unequal treaty revision. He followed of Minister Inoue’s 
ideas to achieve this end, but also took advantage of international developments. Japan 
managed to alter the unequal treaties with his oversight. The Japanese began to study an 
earlier 1883 treaty between the British and Italians that focused on commerce and 
navigation because it treated both Britain and Italy as equal peers. Then the Japanese 
successfully negotiated a treaty with Mexico in 1888 based on the Anglo-Italian model. 
With both a successful template and negotiation experience, Japan had built itself the 
stepping stones to renegotiate its original unequal trade treaties with the world’s most 
prominent Western powers.133 
Minister Mutsu then used Japan’s domestic developments in concert with what he 
had observed about world power politics. He showcased Japan’s new 1889 constitution 
and law codes and leveraged his knowledge about domestic popular opinion. He knew 
that “the Japanese people would never be satisfied…by a compromise” and that treaty 
revision would have to “confer equal rights and obligations on both sides.”134 While 
negotiating the treaty with Mexico, Mutsu learned how to conceal possibly unpopular 
treaty discussion from the Japanese public while taking advantage of the competition and 
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jealousy between Western powers. He pursued these goals simultaneously by negotiating 
with countries individually and in their capital cities.135 By not having negotiations in 
Japan, he lessened the opportunities for the Japanese public to learn about negotiation 
details to which they might vehemently object. 
All of this meant that by the 1890s, Mutsu had advantages for revising the 
unequal treaties that his predecessors did not. Japan had (1) a constitution that made it 
appear familiar instead of alien to Western societies, (2) a plan to keep the Japanese 
populace from disturbing the renegotiation process, (3) a foreign minister with experience 
in negotiating an equal treaty, and (4) a foreign minister who understood how to exploit 
Western powers’ competition with each other. For the first time, Japan had the chance to 
play on a level field with Western counties in terms of treaties. The Japanese Imperial 
Cabinet approved Mutsu’s treaty revision plans in July 1893.136 He sent a diplomat to 
renegotiate the unequal treaties with both Germany and Britain.137  Germany proved 
unresponsive, but Britain was open to discussions.138 By September 1893, the diplomat 
Aoki Shuzo and the British Minister to Japan embarked on initial negotiations in London 
that lasted until December when they produced an amended draft.139  
Mutsu’s plans partly backfired at that point because the Japanese Diet and public 
learned about a draft allowing foreigners into Japan’s interior. Xenophobia drove popular 
unrest. Interestingly, the domestic Japanese turmoil hastened the British decision to 
acquiesce because they understood that much of Japan held foreigners and the unequal 
treaties with distain. 140  Extraterritoriality had brought significantly increased contact 
between Japanese and Westerners. Western powers began to fear that continued extra-
territoriality might stir so much anti-Western sentiment that they would ultimately lose 
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Japan as a trade market.141 This worked to Japan’s advantage because the British grasped 
that “if it did not renegotiate the treaties, the Japanese government might be forced to 
denounce them unilaterally under the force of public opinion.”142 Britain would then be 
stuck with the extra-territoriality clauses of the original treaty and find itself in a 
predicament to inevitably lose all trade with Japan. Renegotiations resumed in April 1894 
and overlapped in June with Japan sending troops to Korea to challenge China’s 
historical preeminence on the peninsula.143 Once again, this development worked to 
Japan’s advantage because it increased both Japan’s and Britain’s urgency to conclude 
negotiations. They signed a new, equal treaty on 16 July 1894. The treaty had three main 
parts: “ending…extraterritoriality not earlier than five years after its signature, an agreed 
“ad valorem” import tariff, and a protocol introducing the new tariff one month after the 
exchange of ratifications.”144 
2. Remaking National and Regional Boundaries  
Learning about the international environment deeply affected how Meiji leaders 
approached foreign policy. At the time, the great powers were all imperialist and viewed 
uniform governance within clearly defined borders145 to be a key aspect of respectable, 
modern states. Japan’s leaders set out to emulate great power foreign policy by clearly 
defining its boundaries This brought Sakhalin, the Kuril, and the Ryukyu islands into the 
political spotlight. Japan did not have a capable enough military in the early Meiji period 
to defend Japanese living in all of those places. Despite this, Japan had to contend with 
domestic and international pressure to assert prestige by boldly claiming and defending 
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territory. The domestic concerns were the most pressing because Meiji rule was young 
and thus still had a fragile hold on power.146  
Drawing clear boundaries removed ambiguities and buffer areas between its land 
and that of other countries. For Japan, this meant defining its borders along Russian 
territory in the North and Chinese territory in the South. Japan was inferior to Russia in 
both wealth and strength at the time. Somewhat ingeniously, Japan proposed and received 
a compromise in the North by removing all claims to Sakhalin while fully claiming the 
Kurils. They signed the agreement in St. Petersburg in May 1875.147 Domestic and 
international affairs opposed each other. To the Japanese public, this was a weak and 
unpopular move. Nationalism was taking hold like it had in the powerful empires that 
Japan began to emulate.148 However, Japan would almost certainly be defeated in the 
international arena, and lose chances of building future prestige, if it tried to be more 
assertive toward Russia at that moment in time.149  
The Ryukyus were more complicated because Japanese citizens did not live there. 
Instead, a southern Japanese clan was historically responsible for interacting with the 
small island kingdom that sent tribute to multiple countries, including Japan.150 The 
Japanese used military force to establish its boundaries around the Ryukyu kingdom 
between 1872–1881. 151  During this period, a ship carrying men from the Ryukyus 
shipwrecked on Taiwan, at which point the local Taiwanese slaughtered them.152 The 
powerful Satsuma clan in southern Japan claimed that the Ryukyuans were their kinsmen 
and demanded revenge. The Meiji government reluctantly sanctioned an “expedition to 
Formosa in 1874 … to chastise the …barbarians for attacking Japanese subjects in the 
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Ryukyu (Loochoo) islands.” 153  This demonstrated how differently Japan saw 
international norms than before: Japan used forceful retaliation in the same manner that 
Western countries of the period did to protect its citizens abroad.154 During the preceding 
Tokugawa Era, Japan had disregarded international norms almost entirely. 155  With 
British help, the Meiji government negotiated with China to end the retribution Embassy 
in exchange for “a sum to defray [Japan’s] expenses and a promise” that China would 
“accept the Ryukyuans as Japanese subjects.” 156  Having clarified some initial 
boundaries, Meiji oligarchs saw that they had gained a measure of respect because the 
outside world accepted the manner in which Japan “defended” its territory. Japan’s next 
foray into claiming and protecting its borders occurred with the Korean Peninsula in the 
1890s and demonstrated considerably increased boldness.  
Korea serves as a platform to see how much Meiji Japan conformed to 
international relations standards and how aggressive its leadership became. Japan’s 
actions regarding the Korean Kingdom shortly after the Meiji Restoration provides a 
baseline to grasp how much Meiji oligarch’s changed Japan by 1894. Newly-emplaced 
Meiji leaders grew offended that “Korea… reject[ed] out of hand her overtures for 
recognition” 157  shortly after the Restoration. Japan’s new leaders wanted to change 
Korea’s behavior. To so do, they had to interact with China because of China’s traditional 
suzerainty over Korea’s foreign policy.158 In March 1873, China gave Japan’s foreign 
minister a formal Imperial audience in Peking “to discuss” Korea’s attitude. 159  By 
dealing with China instead of Korea, Japan acknowledged China’s hold over Korea. This 
meant that Japan’s leaders saw China as more powerful than Japan. That Japan stopped 
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short of engaging in battle with Korea in this incident also signals that Japan did not feel 
powerful enough. 
By 1894, Japan’s position relative to China had changed. The Japan-Korea trade 
relationship grew during the 1870s and 1880s to the point where some Japanese advised 
Koreans in political and military affairs in an official capacity. Because the Meiji 
government had already steered Japanese society toward patriotism, Korean infighting 
that resulted in Japanese officers and civilians dying in Seoul provoked aggressive 
rhetoric amongst the Japanese populace.160 Although Meiji Japan was building up its 
military in accordance with modern state trends around the globe, it was not ready for a 
military engagement in the 1880s. Thus, domestic frustration with government inaction 
mounted while the population grew fixated with events in Korea and China. This 
eventually helped propel Meiji Japan toward the Sino-Japanese War of 1895.161  
The Korean Peninsula concurrently attracted attention from other powerful 
countries. Russia and China also tried to gain influence in the Korean Kingdom through 
advisors because they were also “modern” and “modernizing” states vying for power.162 
For the Meiji government, this resulted in domestic voices calling for patriotic aggression 
while expansionist criteria dictated that Japan compete against Russia and China to win 
the most influence in Korea. In 1885, China and Japan clearly emerged as the two main 
competitors in Korea. One of the most powerful Meiji oligarchs—Ito Hirobumi—and 
China’s chief politician regarding Korea—Li Hongzhang—negotiated an understanding. 
This Li-Ito pact dictated that each country would refrain from having a military presence 
in Korea without first notifying the other.163 A domestic Korean rebellion in 1894 caused 
the Korean King to invite Chinese troops. This in turn tripped clauses in the Li-Ito pact 
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and Japan then sent troops as well. The stage was then set for the Chinese-Japanese 
competition to devolve into a military engagement.164 
Japan’s decision to take Korea by warring with China seems to be the making of 
its own leaders. Japan’s success, however, seems to have been partly due to the 
international relations environment. Given the Imperial Japanese government’s 
dedication to learning as much as possible about the West, it is likely that its leaders 
predicted that Western powers would not intervene. The British seriously considered “a 
warlike demonstration in the seas around Japan” as a deterrent.165 However, Britain, 
along with other powers, did not want to hinder the only buffer between their influence in 
Asia and Russian expansion southward.166 The Japanese Foreign Minister even went so 
far as to provide a safety net in the event that Japan’s leaders misunderstood the power 
dynamics between Western countries. Mutsu assured foreign powers that Japan would 
not impede their trade in Shanghai.167 
Meiji Japan eventually used military force against Korea and annexed the 
Kingdom as a colony, demonstrating Japanese adherence to modern state principles of 
the day.168 Meiji Japan was willing to behave aggressively toward the historical regional 
leader—China, demonstrating how closely the country’s leaders ascribed to Western 
influence after only a few decades. Domestic dynamics within Japan also demonstrate 
how well-informed Japan’s oligarchy had become in international relations. By the end of 
the Korea campaign in 1895, the Japanese Premier, Foreign Minister, and War Minister 
recognized that Japan had become “unpopular” and were “anxious to respect foreign 
rights and to conclude peace as soon as possible.”169 In contrast, the Japanese public 
wanted the war to continue until “the Japanese flag was planted in Peking.”170 The 
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oligarchy demonstrated a measure of restraint in squashing the original plan to invade 
Korea and in how they ended the Sino-Japanese War. This shows that not only did the 
oligarchy seek and retain a fairly accurate understanding of the rules by which world 
powers played, but they could also enforce decisions independently of popular opinion.  
E. TRIPLE INTERVENTION AND REGIONAL-CENTRIC THINKING  
Japan’s aggressive foreign policy toward Korea and China is inextricably linked 
to new understandings of Asia in Meiji Japan. Western countries remained the most 
powerful in Asia and reprimanded Meiji leaders for their decisions. This Triple 
Intervention showed that although Japan gained more respect with the ending of the 
unequal treaties, it was not as much as Japan wanted. Pre-existing political opinions in 
Japan primed the populace to grow angry about the results of the Sino-Japanese War. 
The Japanese oligarchy failed to fully understand the rules by which Western 
powers interacted. To Japan’s surprise and dismay, three of the great powers intervened 
at the end the Sino-Japanese War. Germany, Russia, and France pressured Japan to return 
the Liaodong peninsula to China by convincing the leaders that “trouble” would 
inevitably arise from Japan holding onto that land. Japan’s leaders acquiesced despite 
knowing the unrest it would stir at home. Premier Ito Hirabumi “arranged for the emperor 
to announce the retrocession of Liaodong” to the Japanese people because his “rulings 
were beyond criticism.”171 Japan then used the large indemnities it gained to further 
develop its military capabilities.172  
As with Britain’s decision not to intervene initially, Germany, Russia, and 
France’s decision to intervene after the war was to protect their individual interests. This 
demonstrates not only that Japan inaccurately predicted Western powers’ decisions, but 
also that Japan’s leaders had to give way to foreign relations beyond their control. One 
must conclude that Japan’s oligarchy therefore proactively shaped as much of Japan’s 
foreign affairs as possible yet begrudgingly acquiesced to Western demands when their 
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predictions failed. While this acquiescence is reminiscent of the Shogun giving in to 
unequal trade treaties, the Meiji government’s openness toward Western ideas had 
already unwittingly prepared the Japanese population to react differently.  
The Triple Intervention ignited imperialistic Asian-centric thinking among the 
Japanese population. Before the Sino-Japanese War, undercurrents of “Asianism” had 
developed alongside nationalism in the “newly-politicized society.”173 Before the War, 
Asianism encompassed frustration with the government for devoutly embracing nad 
focusing on the West.174 The ideology had gained enough traction that the government 
used Asianism as part of the official rhetoric justifying Japan beginning the Sino-
Japanese War—Meiji leaders could now say they were focusing on Asia. 175  While 
advancing into other countries seemed like a natural development to the Japanese who 
intentionally mimicked the West to avoid being conquered, some Western powers were 
surprised. The three great intervening empires were “alarm[ed] at the quick tempo of 
Japanese expansionism” and sought to “preserve as much of China as possible for their 
own exploitation.”176 This evidence of Western surprise—The Triple Intervention—was 
itself a surprise to the Japanese. The fact that it was combined with self-serving goals 
must have seemed to the Japanese like Westerners were unwilling to respect others, no 
matter how “modern” the state. The Japanese interpreted this to mean that regardless of 
how much Japan self-strengthened and transformed, the Western powers continued to 
play a zero-sum power game. 177  As a result, the Triple Intervention changed the 
Asianism and nationalism that already existed. Some Japanese began advocating “Pan-
Asianinsm” in which Japan had both the means and responsibility to guide Asians into 
the future while protecting them from the West.178 
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F. CONCLUSION 
Meiji Japan emerged in an age when there were two strategic options: either be an 
imperialist or be colonized. Meiji leaders chose to model Japan’s foreign policy after 
imperialist Western behaviors and successfully implemented a top-down revolution. 
Because of their leadership, Japan responded to the Western threat by emphasizing the 
importance of foreign affairs, mimicking Western ideas of boundary-making, and 
negotiating treaties with dignity. These reforms put Meiji Japan in a position to behave 
imperialistically, annexing non-Japanese people in the Ryukyus, Taiwan, and Korea. This 
produced mixed reactions from Western powers.  
The 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance shows British recognition of Japan as the 
major regional player.179 Japanese efforts to understand and behave like Western powers 
mostly succeeded—Japan remained independent and became more powerful than its 
neighbors. The Alliance shows how far Japan had come because it specifically 
demonstrates that Japan had earned a measure of respect beyond trade. In a sense, Meiji 
Japan’s leaders surpassed their goal for overturning the treaties that had brought shame, a 
coup, and civil war.  
The Triple Intervention exemplifies negative Western reactions to Japan’s foreign 
policy reforms. It intensified anti-Western and imperialist sentiments among the 
Japanese. This culminated in the Japanese population and leadership uniting behind the 
idea of Japan asserting itself regionally. The military reforms of early and middle Meiji 
Japan ultimately facilitated Japan’s new take on foreign affairs. 
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III. MEIJI JAPAN’S MILITARY REFORMS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Important changes in Meiji Japan extended beyond nurturing a different 
understanding of foreign affairs. One of the most impactful categories of Meiji reforms 
were reforms related to the military. Meiji Japan existed because Japanese elites feared 
that a weak Japan increased the likelihood of the country’s demise. Meiji leaders thus 
primarily concerned themselves with “capacity to preserve the nation’s independence.”180 
The Tokugawa Era had famous military elements, yet those elements could not compete 
with the late 1800s Western militaries. Meiji leaders therefore kept military strength as 
“the bedrock of power…. albeit in a new guise.”181 They achieved this new guise by 
changing military fundamentals in personnel and equipment to thoroughly align with 
Western examples before engaging in conflicts. They also slowly altered Japanese 
attitudes toward the West. They found these changes sometimes difficult to implement 
and learned considerable lessons from the Satsuma Rebellion and the need for domestic 
control. However, these changes were nonetheless worthwhile as they helped Meiji 
leaders steadily achieve a top-down revolution.  
B. BACKGROUND  
Meiji reforms affected the foundation of Tokugawa power: the military. 
Tokugawa military traditions had feudal personnel structures, less advanced military 
equipment, and a defensive attitude toward the world. The Tokugawa Shogunates 
continued their predecessors’ military habit of reserving military membership for a 
warrior class, specifically excluding most of the population. Such policies likely arose in 
reaction to powerful peasant revolts in the 1400s. Peasants in the prefeudal and early 
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feudal times had arms to defend their land. When feudalism took root, the lords and 
higher leadership realized they could only sustain their positions if they disarmed the 
peasants. Toyotomi Hideyoshi—the predecessor to Japan’s first Shogun—actually 
instigated a “Great Sword Hunt” in 1587 that removed peasants from militaristic 
activities.182  
Foreign ideas and interactions had little influence in Japan before Perry’s arrival. 
The Tokugawa attitude toward the rest of the world fits into one phrase: “closed 
country.”183 Not only was Tokugawa Japan’s knowledge of the West mainly limited to 
annual Dutch reports to the government about world events, the country’s regional 
foreign relations did not extend far beyond trade.184 Domestic feudal military units thus 
did not interact in concert, on a large scale, or with foreign state actors. Though military 
equipment included firearms, the domestic focus eliminated any need for equipment like 
large naval vessels to transport military units off the islands.185  
Japanese military changes took root in the years leading up to and during the 
Restoration itself. In the Tokugawa Era, the Japanese learned from the lessons of China’s 
Opium Wars through both Dutch and Chinese contacts. There is literary evidence of this 
as early as 1843.186 By the time a Western military took an interest in Japan, the local 
elite had learned from the tales of Western military interactions with China. A decade 
later, Commodore Matthew Perry arrived with the United States’ Navy.187 Even if Perry 
had not sparked a civil disagreement in Japan, external influences and an internal chain of 
events had already begun that would inevitably change the country. Just one year after 
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Perry arrived, a Russian mission arrived with a similar purpose to Perry’s. 188  The 
Japanese did not make the Chinese mistake of trying to repel Western militaries by force. 
Instead, the Japanese elite—both Shogunate forces and insubordinate lords—began a 
snowball process of learning quickly from every interaction. Many elites within Japan 
recognized that Western militaries played key roles in the Asian power balance. 
Changing Japan’s military was a natural reaction to survive the striking and new power 
balance. 
Before facing mutiny, the Shogun engaged in a scheme to adapt in the face of 
Western militaries. The Shogunate began to increase knowledge and possession of 
Western military technology from the Dutch after the first Opium War.189 Then, the 
Shogun hired a French military mission within a few years of acquiescing to Perry’s 
demands. French Captain Jules Brunet arrived in 1865 and began to advise military 
reforms.190191  
The mutineers who eventually overthrew the Shogun came from the Choshu and 
Satsuma regions, and evidence of their military reforms extends back to Perry’s arrival. 
The Satsuma leader had personnel study a rifle that Americans showed to the Shogun.192 
The Satsuma clan was one of the most powerful in the country and Japanese smiths had 
competently produced firearms for centuries.193 The most powerful clan did not need to 
study another variation of a weapon that was only a moderately effective compared to 
other military technology at the time. The Satsuma leader taking an opportunity to study 
a new rifle design demonstrates how committed Japanese leaders were to having military 
strength. Western technology inclusion into the Tokugawa military was pivotal in that it 
allowed relatively untrained individuals to be as effective militarily as well-trained 
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samurai. This Tokugawa military reform became fundamental in the struggle that began 
the Meiji Era.194 The Choshu and Satsuma clans trained with Western arms after Perry’s 
visits and used them to help defeat the Shogunate forces. 
Aside from weaponry, the opposition forces also organized their fighting 
forces differently. The Kiheitai was a fighting unit in Choshu comprised of both Samurai 
and peasants from multiple classes. Choshu leadership established this unit in 1863, and 
this group was one of the main fighting groups in the Meiji Restoration. They 
demonstrated that rebellious clans accomplished the first meaningful military reform 
before the Shogun. The men involved would become the most influential with later 
Meiji military reforms, particularly Omura Masujiro and Yamagata Aritomo. This is 
significant because by incorporating more than the Samurai, they “cut to the very root of 
feudalism…thus…called for a new social organization. Kiheitai represented a kind of 
peasant revolt controlled from above.”195 Yamagata Aritomo himself participated in the 
Kiheitai.196 In these foundational years of the Meiji Era, an eccentric thinker named 
Shoin Yoshida emerged with a vision of a powerful imperial army based on “Yamato 
Damashii,” or the national spirit of Japan.197 Yamagata later made this vision a reality as 
he maintained prominence in the Meiji Era that followed.  
C. PERSONNEL  
Like many reforms constituted Meiji Japan’s top-down revolution, military 
changes began with its people. The Meiji oligarchy made reforms regarding military 
personnel because feudal militaries were inferior to their contemporary Western 
militaries in numbers, tactics, and overall effectiveness. Without large numbers of people 
who are well-trained in modern tactics, funding and equipment are useless. Teaching and 
controlling personnel on a vast scale required implementing training programs, new 
command and control structures, and reshaping social aspects of the military. Two 
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members of the Meiji oligarchy—Omura Masujiro and Yamagata Aritomo—were 
particularly influential in implementing and continuing military personnel reforms. Their 
changes ultimately shaped not only military personnel, but also much of the populace.  
1. Leaders 
Omura Masujiro was one of the forbearers of the Restoration. Yamagata Aritomo 
was a general participant and follower. Then in 1869, Omura Masujiro was 
assassinated. 198  Omura was Vice Minister of War by that time and had taken a 
controversial stance on army personnel issues.199 He was assassinated because he began 
the process of general conscription.200 Yamagata replaced Omura as Vice Minister of 
War the next year upon return from an overseas tour.201 Yamagata’s time as part of 
Choshu’s revolt efforts shaped his views to resemble Omura’s in many ways. However, 
he was more successful than his predecessor. Between 1868 and 1890, “Yamagata and 
the other Meiji leaders had splintered a tradition of military-civil relations spanning two 
millennia.”202 Their changes centralized the military and society under a Western-style 
constitution while implementing increasingly strict control of the military.  
Yamagata formed initial military-esque entities that foreshadowed the 
conscription-based system to come. In March 1868, Satsuma troops and some others 
became a guard unit for the early form of central government called the “Court Bureau.” 
Though this did not last, the approximately 400 men were the first armed men to work for 
the new national-level government.203 The new government later created the Imperial 
Guard in 1871. Three of the most powerful daimyos supplied approximately 10,000 men 
in total.204 This second group of armed men provided the preliminary basis for both the 
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future army and police forces.205 Yamagata eventually steered national politics to create 
an Army Service Corps in 1888.206 
2. Conscription 
The new Meiji leaders supported reforms that broke with Tokugawa-era 
traditions. Many leaders supported universal conscription. Among these supporters in the 
Meiji leadership was Saigo Takamore—an important figure in a later revolt against 
change. That not only the young Meiji leaders but also a tradition-oriented person like 
Saigo liked the idea of melding the worlds of military and populace demonstrates its 
appeal. Ideas supporting conscription emerged late in the Tokugawa Era. Pro-
conscription writers in that time seemed to think that the feudal lords could groom 
peasants to have a loyal enough mentality not to revolt. They stressed that the concept 
was rooted in “Japanese historical tradition.”207 They referred to this idea as the “nohei 
system” and advocated that the Shogun’s contemporary system was a hindrance.208 Meiji 
leaders supported the initial Restoration to achieve a country that could withstand the 
West. They knew that drastic change was a necessary element to strength and success. 
Increasing the military’s strength by increasing the manpower seemed like it was worth 
the risk that it may damage other aspects of the Japanese way of life.  
While Omura Masujiro did not conceive the idea of a conscription army for 
Japan, he did propel the idea forward. Before the Tokugawa Era, peasants were involved 
in armed violence. Some people during the Tokugawa Era formed a mixed consensus 
about whether this was a good idea. They referred to these peasant-soldiers as “nohei’.209 
Those writers who favored the old idea created a nostalgic movement by the end of the 
Tokugawa Era.210 Those in favor of the conscription specifically pointed to the peasant-
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soldiers who predated the Tokugawa Era. The idea gained so much momentum that the 
Tokugawa government toyed with the idea of reforming the military to include peasants, 
but eventually rejected it. 211  Their influence culminated with Meiji leaders who 
implemented the Conscription Act of November 28, 1872.212  
When the Meiji leadership finally introduced new concepts to military service in 
1872, they met resistance. Not only was including peasants an unusual move, they had 
been gradually emphasizing fighting men’s loyalty to the national level instead of the 
clan level. Initially, the examiners who implemented the first Conscription Act exercised 
some of their own judgement instead of strictly following policy. Thus, in practice they 
often exempted “upper-class youths.”213 The Act was understandably unpopular because 
there was no inherent reason to think that being forced to serve outside of their traditional 
roles as an honor. Instead, they saw it as a “burden that took the fittest young men from 
the land and threatened them with unknown rigors.”214 Then in 1876, Meiji leadership 
made their experimental Army more legitimate by removing the samurai’s right to bear 
swords. In addition, the government ended traditional samurai stipends. Though these 
moves might have made the Army more prestigious, it initially caused problems by 
negatively impacting the social order. This new rule made many samurai outside of the 
new military feel that the government took their “remaining shreds of both status and 
security.”215 
Disgruntled samurai loyal to their clans led the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877.216 The 
Imperial army, with its new conscript system, beat the samurai fighting this rebellion. 
Yamagata called for an advance of funds during the conflict so that the national army 
could prevail, but the government did not have the money. Despite lack of funds, the 
army that employed peasant conscripts and Western methods won. As a result, the Meiji 
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leadership could clearly see that they had to embrace Western methods above traditional 
Japanese military methods.  
3. Training 
The Meiji leaders also gradually reformed the training and planning systems 
based on Western examples and advice. Omura began this series of events as Vice 
Minister of War. The former Shogun arranged for French advisors to train some of his 
troops. Omura took advantage of this and went a step further by having some of those 
officers establish “a military school in Kyoto.”217 Western societies have long histories of 
military academies, and so this step allowed the Meiji military to align more quickly with 
Western military competence. Thus, Omura allowed not only Western lessons and 
personnel to bleed into the Japanese military, but also an institution type. Part of this 
initial training scheme included the idea that officer corps consisting of Western-trained 
samurai and an enlisted corps consisting of “the population at large.”218 While a similar 
concept existed in some Western militaries, Omura likely favored it because it provided 
some measure of consistency in Japanese societal relations. As the new Meiji military 
continued to develop, social relations within the military added the “glue.” Army units 
“reinforced the family idea in its dealings with new recruits” because unit commanders 
corresponded with recruits’ families before they became part of a unit.219 This tight 
familial and communal relationship added requisite continuity since the Samurai ceased 
to be a specially-privileged class. In such a regionalized country, communal loyalty was a 
pre-existing aspect of life, and so….  
Meiji leaders exposed the officer corps even more to Western ideas, and in 1872, 
they invited a second French mission group. This one, possibly like the group that the 
Shogun invited, focused on small-unit training and fighting spirit.220 This mission trained 
officers and established a system of military schools in Japan. In 1873, the French helped 
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establish the Toyoma school to produce non-commissioned officers (NCO’s) to train the 
“rank and file.”221  These types of officers usually specialized in a specific military 
capability, thus compartmentalizing the army. By adding specialized skills to the new 
national military, Meiji leadership allowed NCOs and their subordinate trainees to 
develop greater pride in their service. By 1875, the French advisors helped found a 
Japanese military academy. This school provided a “science-based education virtually 
unattainable elsewhere” in Japan and produced a “unitary” officer corps.222 Like the 
NCO’s, academy graduate likely felt pride in being among the first to use a science-based 
education in service of the emperor. One of the final steps that Meiji leaders took to 
professionalize the military occurred in 1883. They established a staff college with 
foreign instructors, including Prussian Major Jacob Meckel who arrived by 1885. By 
developing a staff college and employing foreigners from countries with wartime 
experience, Meiji leaders arranged training from which their military could learn lessons 
from foreign wars without enduring them. By diversifying advisors beyond French 
nationals, the new Meiji military learned concepts that apply beyond the unit-level. For 
example, Major Meckel taught large scale operational planning. One of Meiji Japan’s key 
military improvements whose legacy still exists is the extensive railway network—
Meckel emphasized improved transportation as a necessity for large operations. Japan’s 
continued invitations to foreign advisors also meant that Meiji leaders exposed 
themselves to foreign mindsets about strategic threats. An example being that Major 
Jacob Meckel proposed that Korea was a “dagger”-like threat to Japan, encouraging top 
military personnel attending the staff college to think aggressively.223  
4. Command & Control within the Battlespace 
Aside from intentionally infusing foreign lessons, Meiji military leaders also 
learned lessons from the domestic arena. The Satsuma Rebellion taught Meiji leadership 
to separate the command and control functions from administrative functions. Generals 
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should execute command and control better than an enemy to succeed in a conflict. The 
new conscript system required a new control system. The old control system was inherent 
in the feudal military structure—the shogun controlled lords who in turn controlled 
samurai. A conscript system under central government direction lacked mobile or focused 
command and control. Japan had not faced a foreign enemy in a full-scale war, so leaders 
applied a lesson from the recent Prussian victory over France. Meiji leadership replicated 
the Prussian idea of a separate “staff bureau” to control an active battlespace, so that the 
Ministry could continue its focus on administrative duties.224 
5. Discipline Outside of the Battlespace 
Controlling troops outside of a battlespace also became important. The 
government accomplished this by linking the nation, military, and imperial institution 
more closely. Yamagata intentionally molded a specific spirit into the military- 
Bushido—to help in this respect. 225  First, in 1872, he introduced “Tokuho” or the 
Soldier’s Code., then the Admonition to Soldiers in 1878.226  In 1882, the Imperial 
Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors demanded “absolute loyalty to Emperor” and “sacred 
obligations.” 227  New recruits liked this. 228  The Emperor also contributed to this 
development by promising to “worship at Yasukuni the “nation-protecting” Kami [spirit] 
of soldiers who died in his service.”229 It was no longer the government trying to make 
the military loyal to the Emperor. The Emperor was now also loyal to the military. Later 
that year, the military police were established. Yamagata and the Emperor provided 
definition and infused pride in a military that did not exist a generation earlier. Yamagata 
partly did this in an effort to keep the popular rights movement from tainting military 
personnel. This was a vast political movement in which people throughout society felt 
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empowered to explore political ideas from around the globe, form large groups to discuss 
their thoughts, and demand various changes from the government. From the 
government’s perspective, the movement was a disruptive consequence of aligning Japan 
with Western influences.230 As a result of instilling an ethos in the military that ran 
counter to the popular rights movement, Yamagata inserted a self-controlling mechanism 
into the military.231  
6. Social Impacts 
Unifying troops had the additional effect of unifying the populace. One positive—
and possibly unintended—consequence of a conscription-based military was that it 
affected the social fabric by introducing the young men to an “urban environment with 
Western tools and routines” as well as “reading, writing, and technical skills.”232 In 
exposing military men to Western things, a good portion of the population came to see 
the West as less barbaric than previous generations. Because these men from across 
Japan, their shared “unique and universal experience” linked not only them, but also their 
communities to the national level. 233  As these men returned to their families after 
military service, the concept of supreme loyalty to the emperor above a daimyo must 
have seemed less and less strange as time went on. 
Imperial Rescript also abolished the han (Tokugawa—Era domains) in 1871, 
further building the nation toward unity. 234  Prefectures with newly-drawn borders 
replaced them.235 The Meiji government did this to supplant feudal militaries with a 
single national military. This same action also officially ended the feudal social order.236 
The Meiji government successfully used the new military to crush the revolts that ensued 
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in the 1880s. Ending these revolts boosted the central government’s and the new 
prefectures’ legitimacy.237  
Yamagata sought to further cement the new social order and curtail the popular 
rights movement itself by implementing controls on civilian life. 238  He made local 
government “a form of national service” more than “a vehicle for political 
expression.”239 He restructured the police to “to give central government tighter control.” 
The police also received a training school based on the German model.240 Yamagata 
essentially created a whole “local government system” based on the German system to 
provide political and military stability throughout the country.241  
D. FUNDING AND EQUIPMENT  
The Meiji oligarchy understood the connection between reliable, advanced 
military equipment and its manufacturers By investing in domestic and technologically 
advanced military hardware fabrication, they developed industries that could supply 
military resources and a military that perpetually supported the associated industries. 
Government investment in arsenals, shipyards, factories, and metalworking created a 
system that provided for an ever-increasing military-industrial apparatus. 
1. Ideas 
The Satsuma Rebellion reinforced an old idea: government funding is important 
for military success. Although the Imperial Army triumphed, Yamagata initially called 
for an advance of funds. The government lacked money and thus so did the military. This 
could have influenced a terrible outcome if the Imperial Army faced a more formidable 
foe.242 From the start of the Meiji Restoration, the new leadership “was sensitive to the 
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interrelatedness of military requirements, political reforms, economic development, and 
other aspects of modernization.”243 Meiji leadership came to lean on the idea of Fukoku 
Kyohei, which means “rich nation, strong army,” and later became a central idea of Meiji 
Era industrialization.244 The original idea had deep roots: it began in China and existed as 
far back as 338 BC. Fukuzawa Yukichi, a particularly influential late Tokugawa scholar, 
along with early Meiji scholars, embraced this idea.245 
Meiji Japan also emerged at a time when industrialization and free market 
principles ruled Western interactions. Since Meiji leaders looked to Western concepts for 
ways to improve Japan, they likely faced the idea that “Japan, with its cheap and 
abundant labor, would specialize in the low-tech, labor-intensive industries such as 
textiles.”246 Meiji leaders did not hold fast to such industries for inherent comparative 
advantage. Instead, they created it by “promot[ing] industries on which to build a great 
industrial and technological power.”247 Creating comparative advantage in this fashion 
may have been an unintended consequence of pursuing military strength headlong. 
Nonetheless, they realized Freidrich List’s ideas of creating comparative advantage and 
that “the constant danger of war requires each nation to maintain its productive 
capacity.”248  Meiji leaders innovated the military enough to jump-start the Japanese 
economy, aligning with economic theories that suggested innovation could also “drive” a 
capitalist economy.249  
This new economic landscape had a symbiotic relationship with the military 
investments which started it. Military build-up helped spawn military-related industries. 
The industries became robust enough to help provide supplies and tax revenue for 
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continued investment, especially for repairs after conflicts and capital-intensive naval 
endeavors.  
2. How The Symbiotic Relationship Worked 
Meiji military leaders nurtured a symbiotic relationship between the military and 
industrial development that worked well. Determination to build the military helped the 
economy because it “provided demand necessary for … the growth of … struggling 
private firms in the shipbuilding, machinery and machine-tool industries.”250 Though 
Yamagata initially focused the military on domestic matters, he later decided to use the 
military in external warfare. Preparing for this change helped develop the economy, 
which in turn strengthened the military to be more formidable. Strengthening the military 
and using it to ward off foreign threats meant that it required more and improved 
continued resources. The central government could not provide the Imperial Army with 
additional funding, though it helped to create an economy that could. The government 
invested in industries that supported the military, and these industries developed to the 
point where they could support the government with money and the military with 
additional supplies. Some industries were able to support both the government and 
military in later years precisely because the military leadership—as part of the 
government—kept requesting resources.  
Much initial government investment in military-related industries focused on 
hardware. Providing the military with technologically advanced equipment “was the 
principal motivation behind creating and expanding arsenals to the publicly-financed 
shipyards and modern factories which acted as highly effective centers for the absorption 
and dissemination of Western technologies and skills.” 251  The government urged 
“indigenization” of advanced foreign technologies with military applications. 252  The 
government began work on Western-style arsenals and shipyards in 1871. Indigenization 
                                                 
250 Kozo Yamamura, “Success Illgotten? The Role of Meiji Militarism in Japan’s Technological 
Progress,” The Journal of Economic History 37, no.1 (March 1977): 116–118. 
251 Yamamura, “Japan’s Technological Progress,” 113. 
252 Samuels, Rich Nation, Strong Army, 42–44. 
 53
was also evident in the areas of machinery and iron and steel creation.253 This trend 
spurred civilian factory development before and during the coming wars. 254  The 
government’s massive military expenditures had the added benefit of facilitating the 
development of close relations between military technological endeavors and civilian 
businesses.  
Meiji Japan reaped the benefits of these investments and close relationships in the 
Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars. If Japan had not invested in shipyards for naval 
vessels and arsenals for weapons early, the Japanese Navy would not have been able to 
execute their superior tactics, command, and control over the Chinese in Sino-Japanese 
War.255 By spurring civilian factory development before the Russo-Japanese War, private 
business saved the Japanese military. As this second war faded into winter, the Japanese 
army had a “critical shortages of shells.”256 Businesses that produced shells quickly 
responded with additional weapons to abate the “crisis.”257 Stronger civilian businesses 
were also able to produce greater tax revenue for the central government as they grew.  
The government also invested in the equally important raw materials with which 
to make technologically advanced military hardware. Iron and steel were as critical for 
military equipment in the late 1800s as today. Meiji leaders continued the pursuit for 
basic military materials that began in the late Tokugawa Era. The Saga lord initiated steel 
production in 1850 by “buil[ding] the first reverberating furnace … to forge cannon.”258 
Then in 1854, one year after Perry’s arrival and the Western threat became clear, “the 
Satsuma daimyo ordered construction of Japan’s first modern blast furnace…based on 
Dutch design.”259 Twenty years later, the Meiji government established an Ironworks in 
Iwate Prefecture. Eventually, iron from this facility “was equal to the world’s best…and 
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usable for military purposes.” 260  Despite such progress, the government pushed the 
industry more because its leaders were concerned that high import volumes of these 
critical military materials put Japan at a disadvantage by overreliance on foreign 
countries. Even with sites like the Iwate Ironworks, “imported iron and steel still 
accounted for four-fifths of consumption” 261  into the late 1880s. The government 
continued to steer the metalwork industry to mitigate the problem. For example, in 1890, 
the Navy placed “a five-ton open hearth furnace at the Yokosuka arsenal.”262 By the time 
the Japanese won the Sino-Japanese War a few years later and proved itself a possible 
future threat, Western powers ceased to give Japan weapons. This denial hastened the 
Meiji government’s pursuit of “self-sufficiency.” Japan could then rely on domestic 
production because its leaders had developed the industries associated with military 
hardware over several decades. 
This period saw enough economic prosperity that some company owners amassed 
enough wealth to form a distinct group within the merchant class: Zaibatsu.263 Despite 
the initially fruitful relationship between the military and its supporting industries, a large 
shortfall emerged. Many in the government were not inclined to fund ever-increasing 
military needs and tried to freeze expenditures. The chief Meiji leader- the Emperor- 
intervened and ensured that the government provided full support to military funding. In 
1892, the Emperor “offered 300,000 yen from the Imperial purse” for six years “toward 
the navy’s expansion program; and he ordered all government officials to make a 
“donation” of 10% of their salaries.”264 This highly-visible government investment in the 
military continued the symbiotic cycle. The Japanese triumph over China in 1895 proved 
government investment to be the right course of action and shifted the overall Japanese 
“attitude toward the goal of nation’s security.”265  
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E. ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WEST  
A secondary effect which occurred as part of the other Meiji military reforms was 
Japan’s changing attitude toward the West. Eventually, Meiji leaders like Yamagata 
learned to transform animosity toward the West that was prevalent in the Tokugawa Era. 
This animosity morphed into voluntary learning about multiple Western examples to 
catapult Japanese military into great strength. This changing attitude toward the Western 
world was a crucial step to allowing Meiji Japan to take advantage of Western 
knowledge.  
1. Open-Mindedness 
The Opium Wars and Perry’s arrival impacted Tokugawa elites who became 
Meiji leaders beyond igniting a drive to Western-style military strength. Western 
interactions impressed upon Meiji leaders a secondary goal “to be accepted as a civilized 
nation.”266 This was a stark change from years of prideful isolation. Yamagata angrily 
described Westerners as inferior people in his youth.267 By the time he returned from an 
overseas tour in 1870, 268  the expedition group was “infused with … progressive 
notions.”269 A willingness to engage with and learn about Western cultures launched 
multiple government-funded overseas missions, one of which included a trip to a place as 
obscure as a newly-founded capital city in the new outskirts of the United States—
Sacramento.270 
2. Technology 
Meiji leaders quickly advanced Japanese military technology via their decision to 
import Western concepts. For example, they pursued domestic steel production with 
Dutch methods and new machinery for factories. These provided foundations for future 
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military equipment production.271 Both Shogunate and future Meiji leadership fervently 
learned about Western weapons before the Restoration. The Shogunate began to increase 
knowledge and possession of such technology from the Dutch after the first Opium 
War272 and the Satsuma clan lord studied a rifle that arrived with Perry.273 Still before 
the Restoration, in 1863, Japan experienced how lethal a Western attack could be after 
Americans, French, and Dutch retaliated for an attack on their ships at Shimonoseki.274 
Not only did the Japanese learn not to attack the West outright while militarily inferior, 
the event cemented a respect for Western technology that blossomed during Meiji 
reforms. 
3. Training 
By fervently embracing Western training, Meiji leaders turned a potential disaster 
to their advantage. The Tokugawa Era did not provide Meiji leaders with a preliminary 
national army personnel system. Instead of trying to develop indigenous training models 
that taught introduced new personnel to effective but foreign military ideas, Meiji leaders 
borrowed from other countries. Personnel training is one of the most difficult and painful 
military aspects to adjust because it requires people to change the way they perceive their 
roles. By sidestepping the training development process, Meiji leaders ensured that 
military participants had to change their perceptions of their roles as little as necessary. In 
1872, the Meiji leadership issued an imperial mandate that effectively directed the 
military to import and adopt as many aspects of Western training systems as possible.275 
That same year, the government invited another French military advisory mission to 
overlay French tactical training concepts onto small units. 276  This mission trained 
officers and established a system of military schools resembling those in France, 
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including one that transplanted the concept of NCO’s into the Japanese Army.277 Another 
school essentially replicated the French Army Academy and instilled Western scientific 
ideas into future Japanese officers.278  
By blindly and extensively using Western ideas to change the country, Meiji 
leaders unexpectedly invited the populace to voice a cornucopia of political views. The 
Freedom and Popular Rights movement peaked in the 1870s and appealed to the newly-
created national military that did not yet have a solid identity. The Meiji oligarchy saw 
this as detrimental to national as well as military stability. The oligarchy’s new negative 
attitudes toward this aspect of Western cultures led them to firmly guide the military in a 
different direction. Yamagata countered this problem by creating a military identity that 
steered recruits more toward the central government than the West and politics.279 This 
identity became part of the training process that produced and governed military behavior 
and ethos. 
4. Advisors 
The Meiji oligarchy eventually learned that a mix of Western advisors provided 
the most knowledge about military engagements and therefore could propel the Imperial 
Military toward strength. Neither Dutch stories, French missions, nor later Prussian 
advisors alone provided the necessary kaleidoscope of knowledge. The combination of 
Dutch tales explaining how Western militaries triumphed over Asian ones, French 
emphasis on small unit cohesion, and Prussian strategic insight made the Meiji military 
competitive on an international scale. For example, Prussian insights taught staff college 
students how to plan large scale operations and the necessity of efficient transportation 
infrastructure, storage, and rationing.280 Without these skills, the newly centralized Meiji 
military could not effectively employ the French-trained small units. 
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F. TURN TO EXTERNAL FOCUS  
The most impactful Meiji military reform was turning the military focus to 
foreign affairs. 281  Yamagata allowed the military to develop enduring strengths by 
directing it to develop its foundation inside the country first, such as training and 
technology. This foundation meant little if the government would not use it to impact 
Japan’s international affairs, since Meiji leaders’ primary goal was security in the 
international area. For example, Japanese leaders were hesitant to install extensive 
railways for fear that invading countries might use them. Then, foreign advisors 
counseled Japanese leadership to think about railways as offensive tools rather than 
defensive weaknesses. The promising, newly created and well-trained military could not 
bring about Japan’s international goals if it could not quickly leave the country.282 This 
external focus thus provided additional advantages to the military and made Japan “more 
active” in international affairs.283  
In 1873, leaders with exposure to the West squashed plans to invade Korea in 
favor of solidifying domestic issues.284 At that time, however, China could no longer 
support Korea because of its loss in the Second Opium War. By the 1880s, Russian 
expansion toward an unsupported Korea aligned with Japanese military preparedness. 
Prussian advisor—Major Meckel—by this time voiced the potential threat that Korea 
posed to Japan. This Western military expert’s opinion probably provided one of the last 
necessary pieces of motivation for Yamagata to employ the military outside Japan. When 
Yamagata gave his inaugural speech as Prime Minister in 1890 he publicly shifted the 
country’s military vision to look externally. He did this by announcing Japan’s lines of 
sovereignty and advantage that extended beyond Japanese shores (to where did they 
go?).285 Later that year, Japan hosted an international ceremony and participated in mock 
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battles to explicitly show their military to the world.286 Shifting the military to execute 
Japan’s international goals demonstrated well-timed finesse that no other East Asian 
country achieved at the time. This shift began a cycle of positive effects that led Meiji 
Japan to win its first military engagement, which brought popular support and further 
fueled domestic military build-up.287 
G. CONCLUSION  
Japan’s military reforms in the Meiji Era culminated in a surprising success. 
Tokugawa Japan’s military consisted of personnel organizations and armaments that were 
pieces of compartmented social structures. The armament alone meant that Tokugawa 
Japan lacked naval power and land forces had poor equipment, training, and structure. 
The Tokugawa military would likely have suffered a worse defeat at the hands of 
Western powers than China had. Meiji leaders had the advantage of seeing from China’s 
military troubles with the West that Japan needed to acquire military strength that was 
similar to Western countries. They set about studying and developing Japan’s military to 
achieve this end by restructuring military personnel, revamping training pipelines and the 
chain of command, and invested in a symbiotic relationship between economic growth 
and military capabilities. When popular politic movements threatened ongoing military 
reforms, Yamagata geniously implemented self-imposed discipline among conscription 
soldiers by instilling them with a sense of national (?) pride. All of these reforms changed 
Japan’s military into the opposite of what it had been under Tokugawa rule. The Meiji 
leaders accomplished these changes—some of which contradicted deeply rooted social 
constructs throughout the country—in less than three decades. This top-down revolution 
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The Tokugawa dynasty’s approach to foreign affairs failed to meet the threat 
posed by the West coming into the East. This placed pressure on Tokugawa leaders, 
which doubled under domestic discontent at Japan’s response to the West. Meiji leaders 
were astonishingly successful at alleviating these pressures by making Japan’s foreign 
affairs robust instead of non-existent like it had been in Tokugawa times. They changed 
how the population of an entire country behaved toward the outside world, which was 
necessary to implement the institutions that could withstand Western pressures.  
During Meiji Japan, imperialism was one part of more general “expansionism” 
that captivated Western powers’ foreign affairs strategies. Expansionism basically 
encompassed all means of gaining influence in foreign lands. Colonization and 
annexation were on one end of a spectrum that included trade and individual social 
relationships at the other end. The Japanese oligarchy employed many of these tools and 
ultimately gained a degree of respect the West. Meiji leaders learned to familiarize its 
population and Western audiences with each other, laying the groundwork for better 
state-state relations because the people enacting diplomatic ties did not seem so alien to 
one another.288  
 Meiji Japan’s Foreign Ministers came to understand Western standards for 
respectable countries and followed suit in boundary-making, foreign trade, and then 
asserting itself regionally, namely in Korea. While this produced benefits like ending the 
humiliating unequal trade treaties, it also produced negative results like the Triple 
Intervention. Ultimately, however, the early and middle Meiji changes set Japan on 
course to sign its first alliance with a Western power within two years of the 20th century. 
That this first alliance was with Great Britain—a preeminent power in Europe—
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underscored how powerful Japan had become. This clearly demonstrated that early and 
middle Meiji leadership had accomplished more milestones than it had setbacks.  
Meiji military reforms managed to reshape feudal social structures to build 
political support while building a centralized military. These changes ultimately 
stabilized the Meiji government’s hold on power while harnessing the populace’s 
capacity to build one of the most instrumental tools in assertive foreign policy—a strong 
military. General conscription with centralized organization and training provided the 
baseline of military strength while nurtured industries provided the resources to arm it. 
Although the social changes instigated rebellions by confronting centuries of traditions, 
the untested Meiji state prevailed and in doing so inspired respect.  
The Meiji oligarchs dissolved plans to invade Korea in the 1870s because they 
understood that the international relations environment would not support it. This 
demonstrated that Meiji leaders had made the first fundamental step in beneficial 
cooperation with the West. They were willing and successful in learning about the 
Western “rulebook” for international relations. Once they made the second fundamental 
step of emulating Western diplomatic and economic behavior, they correctly judged that 
world powers would tolerate a military assertive japan. Going into the 1890s, Japanese 
leaders included military options in foreign policy. Starting the Sino-Japanese War meant 
that Japan intended to challenge the power hierarchy in the region, positioning itself 
against Russia. 289  The speed with which the Japanese eventually invaded Korea 
“confirmed that advanced preparations had been made on a considerable scale.”290 That 
indicates that Japan’s leaders not only knew that military conflict was coming, but had 
been building toward including such acts in its foreign affairs for some time. Each 
observation on Western foreign relations and changes to Japan’s since 1868 maneuvered 
Japan into a position to challenge the new Asian hierarchy.  
Meiji Japan’s foreign policy cemented Japan as an imperialist power instead of a 
place for other empires to claim. Japan’s foreign policy grew because the Meiji oligarchy 
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intentionally learned about, attempted to change, and ultimately reversed how Japan 
interacted with sovereign and powerful Western countries. Part of Meiji leaders’ genius 
was in simultaneously reforming the military. Once Japan had learned foreign policy 
skills that met the leadership’s goals, Japan already had a military to support them. Japan 
succeeded so well at aligning foreign policies with international norms that it behaved 
imperialistically until it was forced to stop. Just like the Western powers from which it 
had learned, Japan ceased to be an imperialist country around the end of World War II. 
Studying how Meiji Japan successfully implemented a top-down revolution to survive 
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